Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries by Schwartz, Sonia & Stahn, Hubert
Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures:
The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries
Sonia Schwartz, Hubert Stahn
To cite this version:
Sonia Schwartz, Hubert Stahn. Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The
Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries. 2010. <halshs-00501831>
HAL Id: halshs-00501831
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00501831
Submitted on 12 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
 
Document de Travail 
         n°2010-16 
 
 
 
 
COMPETITIVE PERMIT 
MARKETS AND VERTICAL 
STRUCTURES: 
  The Relevance of Imperfect 
Competitive Eco-Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
Sonia SCHWARTZ 
Hubert STAHN 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures:
The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries
Sonia Schwartz and Hubert Stahn
GREQAM - Aix-Marseille University
Abstract
Permit markets lead polluting rms to purchase abatement goods from an eco-industry, which
is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of imperfect competition in an eco-
industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting rms. It then characterizes
the second best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to a competitive one, we show that
Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a non optimal level
of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These
distortions increase with market power measured by the margin taken by the non competitive
rms and suggest a second best less stringent pollution cap.
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1 Introduction
Since the American Acid Rain Program, an increasing number of countries chooses pollution
permit markets to challenge pollution problems. Notably, the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) is open since 2005 and the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force in 2006,
establishes an international carbon market, both to ght global warming. The EU ETS, for
instance, covers over 11,500 energy intensive installations representing nearly half of the EUs
emissions of carbon dioxide (Ellerman and al. [7] and [8]). Thus, pollution permit markets
appear to be a useful tool to reduce pollution today.
In fact since the seminal contributions of Crocker [3] and Dales [4], it is well known that this
kind of instrument - by setting a price signal for pollution - exhorts pollutant rms to reduce
their emissions by purchasing abatement goods and services. This specic demand is notably
appeared with the Acid Rain Program (Joskow and al. [14]): this latter has led rms to largely
invest in scrubbers, a technology which enables to burn coal without releasing sulfur. More
recently, the EU ETS leads to an annual spending for pollution reduction representing e2.9
to e3.7 billion which are also mainly invested in this kind of goods. This demand even grows
quickly nowadays since rms must be in conformity with more and more stringent environmental
policies. This phenomena largely contributes to the development of an "eco-industry"1 which
furnishes these products to polluting rms.
This new industry is ranging from the development of clean technologies to the optimization
of methods for monitoring and managing environmental impacts. From that point of view, the
eco-industry represents one of the biggest industrial sectors and covers the pollution management
and resource management activities: it matches, since 2005, the aerospace and pharmaceutical
sectors in size. However, these activities often remain highly concentrated. Vivendi Environment
and ODEO are, for instance, the international leaders in wastewater treatment. Even for more
general waste treatment sector, one also rapidly identies CGEA-Onyx, Sarp, Dalkia, Sita, Elyo.
The air treatment sector, in which LAB represents the European leader, seems perhaps more
competitive but a cooperation with CNIM will maybe challenge this situation.
This points out that perfect competition is a non-suitable assumption to model an "eco-
industry". This has several withdrawals. Notably, the price of the abatement goods does not
completely reect the marginal cost. This clearly a¤ects the decision of the polluting rms,
1This notion was introduced in an OECD report [17]. It consists of activities that measure, prevent, limit,
minimize or correct environmental damages. The reader is also referred to Sinclair-Desgagné [18] for historical
facts in Europe and North-America or to the EU reports [9], [10] and [12].
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i.e. their production level and their arbitrage between pollution permit purchase and emission
reductions. This paper tries to tackle this issue. In fact we consider a vertically related industry
composed of an imperfect competitive eco-industry and standard polluting industry which is
submitted to a competitive permit market.
This fact is very important for the pollution permit market literature. Studies which analyze
pollution permit markets often take as given an emission reduction cost function. By implic-
itly identifying its marginal cost to the production cost of the abatement good, they assume
perfect competition on this market. Under imperfect competition, we can therefore expect that
Montgomerys [15] result which claims that pollution permit markets lead rms to choose the
optimal level of emission reduction is invalidated. This is well known when the permit market
is non competitive (see Hahn [13]). We obtain a similar result with a rather di¤erent approach:
we maintain pure competition on the permit market but introduce an imperfect competitive
eco-industry.
In the best of our knowledge most of the papers which study imperfect competitive eco-
industries only consider, as environmental tool, the pigovian tax (see for instance David and
Sinclair-Desgagné [5] and [6], Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné [16], Canton [1] and Canton and
al. [2]). Our vertical structure remains close to the one of David and Sinclair-Desgagné [5] since
they also introduce competitive polluting rms and an imperfectly eco-industry. Contrary to
their paper, we introduce a third market i.e. the permit one and study the interactions between
all these markets.
It appears therefore that there is no available study of a pollution permit market in presence
of an eco-industry. Thus, the aim of this paper is to ll this gap in the economic literature. In
this article, we consider a sector composed of three markets: an eco-industry, a polluting product
and a pollution permit market. As a benchmark, we assume that these markets are competitive.
The rst result can be exposed, in this case, as "an old wine in a new bottle" because we nd
a traditional result: emission reductions are e¢ cient, and the rst best pollution cap can be
implemented. This result is yet new because the emission reduction cost is not given by a cost
function but is explicitly deduced from an optimal choice of abatement and service goods.
In a second step, we introduce market power on this market, whereas the two other ones
remain competitive. We are then able to analyze the e¤ects of an imperfectly eco-industry on
this three market sector equilibrium. As we already states, it rst appears that the optimal
level of emission reduction is not reached. We next show that market power on the eco-industry
reduces the production levels of the polluting goods and of abatement goods. As less abatement
2
is chosen, the consecutive pollution permit price is higher.
Finally, it appears that the welfare is reduced with respect to the competitive case. To
improve this situation, we turn out to a second best analysis, to determine the optimal pollution
cap in presence of market power. A way to increase welfare under imperfect competition is to
globally reduce less pollution than in the rst best outcome.
The paper is as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the presentation of the model. As a
benchmark, Section 3 analyses the competitive equilibrium of this three market sector and
denes the rst best pollution cap. In Section 4, we introduce imperfect competition in the
eco-industry and we study this new equilibrium. Section 5 discuses the optimal pollution cap in
a second best framework. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. The di¤erent
proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 A vertically integrated polluting industry
In order to illustrate the problem depicted higher, we consider a competitive polluting industry
which faces a standard demand curve. These rms have the opportunity to reduce their emis-
sions by purchasing abatement goods from an upstream eco-industry. Their net emissions must
however be covered by pollution permits supplied on a competitive market. The total amount
of permits is controlled by a regulator.
The polluting industry is composed of a continuum [0; 1] of identical rms which behave
competitively. Each member i 2 [0; 1] of this industry produces a given output q(i) at a constant
marginal cost c > 0 sold at price pQ. This activity is polluting. For simplicity, we identify the
level of emission of each rm to its production. This one can nevertheless by reduced by an
investment in abatement goods sold by an upstream eco-industry. We denote by a(i) the amount
of abatement goods used by rm i 2 [0; 1] and measure the reduction of emissions by the function
 (a(i)). Each rm has access to the same technology which behaves like a standard production
function. We even assume that this function has a constant elasticity, i.e. (a) = a with
 2 [0; 1]. This last assumption gives us the opportunity to capture the e¤ects of the market
power exerted by the eco-industry since (  1) is, as we will see it later, nothing else that the
elasticity of the inverse demand for abatement goods.
The eco-industry, composed of n members indexed by j, supplies these abatement goods
at price pA. We denote by aj the production level of rm j and assume that each member of
3
this industry supports the same unit production cost k per unit of abatement good. As the
number of rms is nite and typically small, these rms choose their quantities strategically.
We are therefore particularly interested by the distortion that is induced with respect to per-
fect competition, especially concerning the total amount of pollution permits emitted by the
regulator.
The nal demand for the polluting good is noted by d(pQ). This function is assumed to be
downward slopping, i.e. d0(pQ) < 0, and to verify2 limpQ!0 d(pQ) = +1 and limpQ!+1 d(pQ) =
0. As a consequence, the inverse demand curve p(Q) = d 1(Q) is dened for all positive aggre-
gated production level Q. We however also introduce a more technical assumption which states
that the elasticity of the marginal demand curve veries ed0 :=
d" p
d0 >  1. This assumption
simplies the study of the second best optimization problem. It is satised if, for instance, the
demand curve is concave. We therefore claim, in some sense, that the demand curve is not too
convex.
The global emissions induce a social damage measured by D(E) which increases at an in-
creasing rate, i.e. D0(E) > 0 and D"(E) > 0. Of course D(0) = 0, and we even assume that the
marginal damage is small for a low level of emission, i.e. limE!0D0(E) = 0 while it becomes
very large for huge emissions, i.e. limE!+1D0(E) = +1.
A regulator controls these emissions by organizing a tradeable pollution permit market, which
is competitive. The polluting rm must cover their emissions with the corresponding amount
of permits. We assume, for simplicity, that the regulator directly sells, at the competitive price
pE , an amount E of permits to these rms. This last assumption directly follows from the
seminal result of Montgomery [15] which claims that the competitive equilibrium of pollution
permit market is independent of the mechanism beyond the permit distribution. We also assume
that E 2 [0; d(c)[ since d(c) corresponds to the production level without regulation, and under
our assumption, to the unconstrained emission level. The equilibrium condition of the permit
market is therefore
E = Q 
Z 1
0
 (a(i)) di (1)
2This strong boundary behavior is essentially introduced for convenience. In fact we want to be sure that
both the equilibrium price pQ and the quantity Q are strictly positive. Our argument also holds if the demand is
bounded from above or if there exists a maximal reservation price provided that this quantity is large enough.
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3 The competitive case: old wine in a new bottle
The purpose of this section is to study the competitive case. This is of course "old wine" because
most of the results are known. The "bottle is nevertheless new": it gives us the opportunity to
understand what changes if an eco-industry is introduced and, from that point of view, gures
out the distortions induced by an imperfect competitive eco-industry.
3.1 The competitive allocation
In the large polluting rm sector, each producer sets her level of production and her demand
for abatement goods in a way to maximize her prot, taking into account the cost induced by
her purchase of pollution permits. Moreover, we know that these rms are identical and belong
to [0; 1]. We can therefore restrict our attention to a representative rm which chooses the
aggregated level of production Q and the aggregated demand A for abatement goods. These
quantities solve:
max
(Q;A)0
(Q;A) := (pQ   c)Q  pAA  pE (Q  (A))
Moreover, it is immediate that this function is linear with respect to Q since @Q = pQ  c pE .
So if the commodity market clears, we can say that:
Remark 1 If the polluting good market is competitive, the equilibrium price pcQ and the amount
of traded goods Qc are respectively given by pcQ = c+ pE and Q
c = d(c+ pE).
It remains to characterize the competitive demand for abatement goods. This one follows directly
from the derivative of the prot with respect to A and is given by3:
 pA + pE0(A) = 0, pA
0(A)
= pE (2)
This is simply old wine because this condition states that the marginal cost of pollution reduction
must be equal to the permit price. In fact, in our setting, a reduction r of the emissions requires
 1(r) abatement goods and costs c(r) = pA 1(r). This condition therefore states that
c0(r) =
pA
0( 1(r))
=
pA
0(A)
(3)
3This condition is necessary and su¢ cient since the prot function is concave with respect to A, i.e. @
2
@A@A
=
"(A) < 0.
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But the bottle is new. The introduction of an eco-industry gives us the opportunity to explicitly
construct the cost c(r) associated to the emission reductions. It emphasizes the technological
aspect of this operation and underlines the impact of the abatement good price. This implies
that the behavior of the polluting rms in now driven by two price signals: the permit price
which transmits some information on the damage and the abatement good price which provides
information on the cost of this good. This latter typically becomes important in presence of
market power even if other markets remain competitive.
But in any case, this last condition gives us the opportunity to directly spell out the inverse
demand function for abatement good4.
Remark 2 If the polluting rms act competitively, the inverse demand for abatement good is
given by PA(A; pE) = pE0(A) while the demand is dened by DA(pA; pE) = (0)
 1  pA
pE

.
Let us now move to the behavior of the rms in eco-industry. These rms support the
same constant marginal production cost k: If they act as pure competitors, a standard market
clearing condition imposes that pcA = k. Moreover, if we restrict our attention to a symmetric
equilibrium, each of them produces at equilibrium acj =
1
nDA(k; pE).
It therefore simply remains to clear the permit market. When both the commodity and the
abatement good markets clear, the equilibrium condition (1) becomes:
E = Ec(pE) := d(c+ pE)  
 
0
 1 k
pE

So, if this demand Ec(pE) for permits is decreasing and satises suitable boundary conditions,
we can claim that:
Proposition 1 If the regulator xes the pollution cap to E 2 [0; d(c)[, our three competitive
market sector admits a unique symmetric equilibrium. We can even say that:
(i) the unique permit price pcE which solves E
c(pcE) =
E is strictly positive if E < d(c),
(ii) the commodity and the abatement good prices are given by pcQ = c+ p
c
E and p
c
A = k,
(iii) the production level Qc = d(c + pcE) < d(c) is reduced with respect to a situation without
regulation,
4Since the emission reduction technology is concave and veries the standard Inada conditions, (0) 1 and,
therefore, the demand for abatement good are properly dened .
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(iv) the eco-industry is active since total amount of abatement goods is given by Ac = DA(k; pcE) =
(0) 1

k
pcE

> 0.
3.2 The optimal choice of the pollution cap
Since the polluting industry induces a negative externality, let us rst characterize an e¢ cient
allocation. In this case, the regulator sets the production levels of each rm in both sectors and
controls for the optimal reduction of the emissions. Her optimal choice maximizes welfare under
suitable feasibility conditions.
As the polluting rms share the same linear cost, the regulator can therefore restrict her
attention to the aggregated production level Q =
R 1
0 q(i)di. Moreover, let us remember that the
emission reduction function (a) is concave and that the social damage D(E) is increasing and
convex. This implies that, at an e¢ cient allocation, each polluting rm reduces her emissions
by using the same amount A of abatement goods, and this quantity can be identied to the
aggregated quantity traded on this market5. The allotment of this quantity to the producers
does not really matter since each rm in the eco-industry supports the same marginal production
cost. From that point of view, we study the welfare properties by restricting our attention to
the aggregated variables. More precisely the e¢ cient production level Qe and the total amount
of abatement good Ae solve:
(Qe; Ae) 2 arg max
(Q;A)0
Z Q
0
p(Q)dQ  c Q  k A D (Q   (A))
with the e¢ cient amount of emission given by Ee = Qe    (Ae). We can even claim (see the
proof of Proposition 2) that the following rst order conditions(
D0 (Ee) = p(Qe)  c
D0 (Ee)0(Ae) = k
(4)
fully characterize the optimal solution.
This is again an old wine in a new bottle. The rst condition tells us that the optimal
pollution cap must be set in a way which ensures that the marginal damage is equal to the
marginal benet of the consumers which is represented, here, by the marginal net surplus. The
second one illustrates the idea that the marginal e¤ect on pollution of the use of an additional
5This follows directly from the fact that we have introduce a continuum [0; 1] of polluting rms, i.e.
R 1
0
Adi = A.
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unit of abatement good is equal to its marginal production cost. This is of course equivalent
to state that the marginal damage is equal to the marginal cost of emission reduction, i.e.
D0(E) = c0(r) = k0(Ae) . This again underlines the importance of the abatement technology
and of the marginal production cost. So, if the price of the abatement good is not equal to its
production cost - even when both the commodity and the permit market are competitive - one
can expect that the rst best allocation is out of reach.
So if we want to summarize our results, we can state that:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique interior solution (Qe; Ae) to this problem which has the
property that:
(i) the strictly positive pollution cap is given by Ee = Qe    (Ae) > 0;
(ii) the aggregated production level satises Qe = d (c+D0(Ec)) ;
(iii) the e¢ cient amount of abatement goods is Ae = (0) 1

k
D0(Ee)

.
Let us now compare the e¢ cient production levels Qe and Ae to those obtained at the
competitive equilibrium (see Proposition 1 (iii) and (iv). We obtain the traditional result which
claims that the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient if the permit price is equal to the marginal
damage, i.e. D0(Ee) = pE . It is, again, also important to notice that this result holds because
the competitive prices are equal to the marginal production costs. This is particularly true for
the abatement good price pA which must be equal to k. Thus, if the rms in the eco-industry
take a margin over their costs, one can expect that none of these results hold.
4 An imperfect competitive eco-industry
Let us now move to a situation in which market power is introduced within the eco-industry
whereas the two other markets remain competitive. In this case, we essentially show that the
rst best cannot be reached whatever the level of the pollution cap. In order to obtain this result,
we rst analyze the optimal strategies of the eco-industry members, and we then compute the
equilibrium of this three market sector.
4.1 The optimal strategies
By imperfect competition, we simply mean that rms in the eco-industry act as Cournot players.
It therefore becomes important to know the inverse demand for abatement goods. Since the
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polluting rms maintain their competitive behavior, Remark 2 remains true and the inverse
demand curve is given by PA(A; pE) = pE  0(A). From that point of view, each producer
j = 1; : : : ; n; composing the eco-industry chooses her production level in order to maximize:
max
aj0
 (aj ; a j) :=
"
pE  0
 
nP
j=1
aj
!
  k
#
 aj
If a Nash equilibrium exists, we can say that the optimal strategies satisfy the following set of
First Order Conditions:
8j = 1; : : : ; n; pE  0  Aic  k+ pE  "  Aic  aicj = 0
Since the rms in the eco-industry are all symmetric, we can even expect that this Nash equi-
librium shares the same property, i.e. aicj =
Aic
n . The preceding set of FOCs can be replaced by
the following aggregated condition:
pE  0
 
Aic

=

1 +
"0
n
 1  k (5)
where "0 stands for the elasticity of 0. With an isoelastic abatement function, this latter is
even constant and is given by "0 =   1.
Let us now observe that pE 0
 
Aic

is, by our early denition of the inverse demand curve,
the price picA that clears the abatement good market. The quantity
m :=

1 +
"0
n
 1
=
n
n+   1
can therefore be viewed as a margin since picA = m  k; which measures the degree of the market
power of the eco-industry.
To sum up, we can assert that:
Proposition 3 Whatever the permit price pE, we can say that:
(i) there exists a unique symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the eco-industry,
(ii) the level of abatement goods Aic produced by this industry is given by Aic = (0) 1

m  kpE

;
(iii) the equilibrium price picA is obtained by taking a margin over the marginal cost, i.e. p
ic
A =
m  k.
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4.2 Equilibrium and ine¢ ciency
Let us now move to the study of the global equilibrium of our three market sector. Since the
nal good market works competitively, Remark 1 remains true and we simply have to care about
the equilibrium on the permit market. Under imperfect competition, this equilibrium condition
(see Eq. (1) ) becomes:
E = Eic(pE) = d (pE + c)  
 
0
 1
m  k
pE

So, if this demand Eic(pE) for permits is decreasing and satises suitable boundary conditions,
we can claim that:
Proposition 4 If the regulator xes the pollution cap to E 2 [0; d(c)[, our three market sector
admits a unique non competitive equilibrium and we even observe that:
(i) the equilibrium quantities Aic(m; E) and picA(m; E) decrease with E;
(ii) the production level Qic(m; E) increases with E and veries that @Q
ic(m; E)
@E 2 ]0; 1[.
It appears that these last properties are, from a qualitative point of view, similar to those
obtained in the competitive case but this does not mean that market power does not matter
because it a¤ects the equilibrium levels. Indeed as the eco-industry takes a margin over their
costs, the incentives to buy abatement goods are reduced, i.e.
8m > 1 Aic =  0 1m  k
pE

<
 
0
 1 k
pE

= Ac
It is therefore obvious that ifm = 1, there is no market power and we are back to the competitive
allocation. This parameter can be used to measure the importance of the distortion induced by
imperfect competition. We can say that:
Proposition 5 As market power increases, we observe that the equilibrium quantities Aic(m; E)
and Qic(m; E) decrease while the permit price picE(m; E) and the abatement good price p
ic
A(m)
increase. Since for m = 1 we are back to perfect competition, we can even say that imperfect
competition (m > 1):
(i) reduces the production of abatement goods i.e. Aic(m; E) < Ac( E) and increases their price
picA(m) > p
c
A;
(ii) increases the permit price i.e. picE(m; E) > p
c
E(
E) and reduces the production of the nal
good Qic(m; E) < Qc( E).
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Let us now move to the e¢ ciency issue. Market power on the upstream market typically
induces cost ine¢ ciencies. In our setting, this market is however linked to the competitive
permit market through the behaviors of the polluting rms. We can therefore expect that this
ine¢ ciency has two aspects.
As usually, imperfect competition on the abatement good market increases the price and
reduces the amount of traded abatement goods (see Proposition 5 (i)). From that point of view,
the price which incorporates a margin never transmits a true cost signal and therefore conducts
the polluting rms to choose a non optimal level of emission reduction.
Since less abatement goods are traded, imperfect competition also induces an additional
demand for pollution permits and contributes to an increase of their price. We recall that the
purpose of this price is to transmit a true information on the marginal damage created by one
emission unit. We can then expect this market over estimates the damage and therefore that
the rms excessively reduce their production of the polluting good (see Proposition 5 (ii)).
In the view of the last proposition, we can also claim that imperfect competitive allocation
is never e¢ cient, even for a suitable choice of the pollution cap. To be more precise, we know
that the competitive allocation is e¢ cient if the marginal damage is equal to the permit price.
Under imperfect competition (i.e. m > 1), the production levels are always strictly smaller than
those obtained under perfect competition, and this result holds whatever the number of permits
available on the permit market. To sum up we can say that:
Proposition 6 If there is market power on the abatement good market (i.e. m > 1), even if
the permit market remains competitive, we observe that:
(i) the polluting rms never choose the optimal level of emission reduction,
(ii) the permit price transmits a biased information on the damage,
(iii) it is impossible to nd a suitable pollution cap E which implements the rst best.
So if we want to nd the accurate pollution cap, we have to move to a second best analysis.
5 The second best policy
The second best policy tries to correct the ine¢ ciency induced by imperfect competition. How-
ever, as noted before, this one produces two e¤ects which are in tension. In fact:
 On the one hand, the regulator may want to make sure that the permit price provides a
non biased information on the damage. In this case, the pollution cap must ensure that
11
the permit price coincides to the marginal damage, i.e. picE(m;E) = D
0(E). However,
this price is always greater than the one obtained under perfect competition. This option
therefore induces a compliant policy or even a too permissive one.
 On the other hand, she may want to correct the distortion on the abatement good market
and, so, to secure the production of the e¢ cient level of abatement good. In this case,
the pollution cap must satisfy picE(m;E) = m D0(E). This makes sure that the marginal
productivity of the abatement technology is equal to kD0(E) and therefore that the cost
e¢ ciency is restored. This policy however induces a high permit price and conducts to a
restrictive emission policy which too seriously depresses the production of the polluting
good.
We can therefore expect that the second best policy weighs these two opposite options. In order
to verify this point, let us rst observe that a second best pollution cap Esb(m) solves:
Esb(m) 2 arg max
E2[0;d(c)[
W (m;E) :=
Z Qic(m;E)
0
p(q)dq   c Qic(m;E)  k Aic(m;E) D (E)
We can even say, under our assumptions, that:
Lemma 1 The previous concave problem (i.e. @
2W (m;E)
@E@E < 0) admits a unique interior solution.
The optimal second best pollution cap satises therefore the following rst order condition:
@W (m;E)
@E
= picE(m;E
sb)  @Q
ic(m;Esb)
@E
  k  @A
ic(m;Esb)
@E
 D0(Esb) = 0 (6)
Now let us remember that a second best policy is chosen within the set of imperfect competitive
equilibria. This means that the permit market always clears so that:
8m;E E = Qic(m;E)    Aic(m;E)) 1 = @Qic(m;E)
@E
  0  Aic(m;E)  @Aic(m;E)
@E
but this also implies that polluting rms make optimal choices, and that:
picE(m;E
sb)  0  Aic(m;E) = m  k
Given these observations, condition (6) becomes:
D0(Esb) =
@Qic(m;Esb)
@E
 picE(m;Esb) +

1  @Q
ic(m;Esb)
@E

 p
ic
E(m;E
sb)
m
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Since @Q
ic(m;Esb)
@E 2 ]0; 1[ (see Proposition 4 (ii)), we can e¤ectively say that the regulator selects
a pollution cap which combines the two objectives that we have depicted earlier. We can even
observe that the permissive policy which consists in transmitting the non biased price signal of
the damage is weighed by the marginal e¤ect of an increase of the pollution cap on the supply
of goods. So, let us consider a situation in which a raise of the pollution cap largely increases
the production of polluting goods. In this case, the regulator favors a permissive environmental
policy because the consecutive increase of the marginal damage is compensated by the e¤ect on
welfare of an increasing production. In opposite, if this e¤ect is not too important, the planner
prefers a strategy which implements an optimal production of abatement goods and, therefore,
leads to a lower pollution cap.
The previous formula gives us the level of the second best pollution cap. This however does
not indicate how market power a¤ects this pollution cap and provides no information on the
gap between the second and the rst best policy. However we know that for m = 1 we have
the competitive, and therefore the rst best outcome. So we must go back to the rst order
condition and look at the second best pollution cap as a function of the mark-up, i.e. compute
Esb(m). In fact:
Proposition 7 We can show that dE
sb
dm > 0, hence:
(i) the second best pollution cap is greater then the rst best one,
(ii) the gap between both increases with the degree of market power.
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of this article was to analyze the relevance of imperfect eco-industry, when a vertical
structure and a competitive pollution permit market are considered. In this new framework,
the polluting rms deal with two price signals to choose their level of emission reduction: the
permit price, which transmits information on the damage value and the abatement good price,
which is related to abatement cost. If these price signals reect the true values, like in perfect
competition, the rst best can be reached.
These results are challenged if we consider an imperfect competitive eco-industry. Both
price signals transmit biased information. The abatement good price includes a margin and
the permit price is higher than the marginal damage. Thus, rms do not choose the optimal
level of emission reduction. So, we extend, in this article, the seminal work of Hahn [13]. As a
consequence, at equilibrium, the production of abatement and polluting goods are reduced with
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respect to perfect competition. As this equilibrium is not e¢ cient, we turn out to a second best
analysis to nd the pollution cap. This optimal choice balances two e¤ects: the rst tries to
restore a true price signal on the damage which leads to a less stringent environmental policy,
whereas the second attempts to correct the abatement good price which induces a more stringent
policy. We even show that the global emission reduction in the second best is lower than in the
rst best.
This paper however remains particular on several respects. The reader surely noticed that
the market power is measured by the margin taken by the eco-industry. This quantity is constant
in our paper, since we have introduced a constant elasticity abatement technology. Even if this
simplifying assumption can be very helpful, if would be interesting to look what happens if a
more general abatement technology is introduced.
In the paper we also only introduce imperfect competition within the eco-industry. This was
enough to underline the double impact of this market structure. It would however be interesting,
especially concerning the policy recommendation, to extend this study by considering di¤erent
sources of market imperfection. We can, for instance, think at imperfect competitive polluting
rms which act strategically on the permit or the commodity market or even on both.
It is also well-known, when there is market power on the permit market, that the initial
distribution of the pollution permits matters. This is of course not the case in our paper, that
why we did not really care about the permit distribution mechanism. So if imperfect competition
is also introduced on this market, the policy maker would have another policy instrument to
restore e¢ ciency.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1 : The existence of a unique competitive permit price
Since we have assumed that (A) is isoelastic6 , we know that the permit demand is given by E(pE) =
d(c+ pE) 

1

k
pE
 
 1
. Now let us remember that d0(pQ) < 0; limpQ!0 d(pQ) = +1 and limpQ!+1 d(pQ) = 0.
Since  2 ]0; 1[ ; we can say (i) that limpE!0 E(pE) = d(c) > 0 and limpE!+1 E(pE) =  1 and (ii) that
E0(pE) = d0(c+pE)  11 

1

k
pE
 1
 1 k
p2
E
< 0 . This is why there exists a unique price pcE which clears the permit
market, i.e. solves E(pcE) = E, for all E 2 [0; d(c)]. The reader even observes that when E = d(c) this unique
solution is given by pcE = 0 because d(c) is the level of emission without regulation.
Step 2 : Prices and quantities
Since the prot of the representative polluting rm is linear in Q and the members of the eco-industry share
the same constant unit production cost, it is immediate that pcQ = c+p
c
E and p
c
A = k. Now let us observe, by Step
1, that for all E < d(c), we have pcE > 0, this implies that Q
c = d0(c+pE) < d(c) and that Ac = (0)
 1

k
pc
E

> 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let us remember that an e¢ cient allocation satises:
(Qe; Ae) 2 arg max
(Q;A)
W (A;Q) :=
Z Q
0
p(Q)dQ  c Q  kA D (Q   (A))
The main question is therefore the existence of a unique solution. We will proceed by steps:
Step 1 : W (A;Q) is a strictly concave function
Let us compute H (W (A;Q)) the Hessian of W (A;Q). This matrix is given by:
H (W (A;Q)) =
"
p0(Q) D" (Q   (A)) ; D" (Q   (A))0 (A)
D" (Q   (A))0 (A) ;  D" (Q   (A)) (0 (A))2 +D0 (Q   (A))" (A)
#
Under our assumptions, we can say that:
6The reader however observes that the proof of this result can be done without using this specic functional
form. In fact our point simply requires that (a) is an increasing and concave function which satises the Inada
conditions. We however need this assumption later in order to nicely identify market power.
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 @2W (A;Q)
@A@A
= p0(Q) D" (E) < 0
 det(H (W (A;Q))) = p0(Q)
h
 D" (E) (0 (A))2 +D0 (E)" (A)
i
 D" (E)D0 (E)" (A) > 0
or, in other words, that the welfare is a strictly concave function. It follows that the solution, if it exists, is unique
and is characterized by the following rst order conditions:(
1(Q;A) :=
@W
@Q
= p(Q)  c D0 (Q   (A)) = 0
2(Q;A) :=
@W
@A
=  k + (D0 (Q   (A)))  0 (A) = 0
Step 2 : The construction of A(Q) satisfying 2(Q;A(Q)) = 0
Let us rst observe that 8Q > 0; limA!0 2(Q;A) = +1 and limA! 1(Q) 2(Q;A) =  k. Moreover, since
D0(E); D"(E) > 0 and " (A) < 0, we can also say that:
@2(Q;A)
@A
=  D" (Q   (A))   0 (A)2 +D0 (Q   (A))  " (A) < 0
It follows, by the implicit function theorem, that 9A : ]0;+1[ ! R with the property that 8Q > 0; (i)
2(Q;A(Q)) = 0, and (ii):
dA
dQ
=
D" (Q   (A))  0 (A)
D" (Q   (A))  (0 (A))2  D0 (Q   (A))  " (A) > 0
Moreover, under our assumptions, we can even say that A(Q) veries:
 8Q > 0, A(Q) <  1(Q), since limA! 1(Q) 2(Q;A) =  k.
 0 (A)  dA
dQ
2 ]0; 1[ because " (A) < 0 and D0(E); D"(E) > 0
 limQ!0A(Q) = 0 since A(Q)   1(Q) and  (0) = 0
 limQ!+1A(Q) = +1. In fact, if A(Q) is bounded, then limQ!+1 2(Q;A(Q)) = +1 because limE!+1D0 (E) =
+1. But in this case we would be able to exhibit a nite Q with the property that 2(Q;A(Q)) 6= 0, a
contradiction.
Step 3 : The existence of a solution
Let us now dene (Q) := 1(Q;A(Q)). It is a matter of fact to observe (i) that limQ!0 (Q) = +1 since
limQ!0 p(Q) = +1 and limQ!0D0 (Q A(Q)) = 0 and (ii) that limQ!+1 (Q) <  c since limQ!+1 p(Q) = 0
and D0 (E)  0. Moreover
d
dQ
= p0(Q) D" (Q   (A)) +D" (Q   (A))  0 (A)  dA
dQ
= p0(Q) D" (Q   (A)) 

1  0 (A)  dA
dQ

| {z }
2]0;1[
< 0
It follows that there exists a unique Qe which solves (Q) = 0 and therefore a unique Ae = A(Qe) such that
(Qe; Ae) satises the FOCs. Moreover, by construction, it is immediate that Ee = Qe    (Ae) > 0, Qc =
d (c+D0(Ee)) < d(c) and Ae = (0) 1

k
D0(Ee)

> 0.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
For a given pollution permit price pE , a Cournot equilibrium on the abatement good market is typically given by:
8j = 1; : : : ; n, aicj 2 argmax
aj


aj ; a
ic
 j

:=
"
pE  0
 
aj +
nP
k=1;k 6=j
aick
!
  k
#
 aj
Step 1 : 
 
aj ; a
ic
 j

is strictly concave in aj
By computation we have:
@2 (aj ; a j)
@aj@aj
= pE  a"(A)
h
2 + ""  aj
A
i
where "" denotes the elasticity of "(A). Since we have also assumed that (A) = A, this expression becomes:
@2 (aj ; a j)
@aj@aj
=  pE    (1  ) A 2 
h
2 + (  2)  aj
A
i
<  pE  2  (1  ) A 2 < 0
Step 2 : The individual equilibrium strategies
If a Cournot equilibrium exists, we know by Step 1, that the individual production levels satisfy the following
set of FOCs:
8j = 1; : : : ; n, @ (aj ; a j)
@aj
=

pE  0 (A)  k

+ pE  "(A)  aj = 0
This implies that:
8j = 1; : : : ; n, aj = [pE  
0 (A)  k]
pE  "(A)
and by summation on j we obtain that:
A = n  [pE  
0 (A)  k]
pE  "(A) , (A) := 
0(A) 

1  "0
n

:
=
k
pE
(7)
where "0 denotes the elasticity of 
0(A). So if there exists a unique A which solves the previous equation, we
can say that there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium and this one is symmetric.
Step 3 : Existence of a unique aggregated production level A
Since (a) = a, we obtain that (A) =   A 1  n +1
n

. We also observe that limA!0 (A) = +1,
limA!1 (A) = 0 and
0(A) =    (1  ) A 2

n  + 1
n

< 0
It follows that there exists a unique Aic which solves (Aic) = k
pE
. Moreover by equation (7), we can say, by
denition of the margin, that
Aic =
 
0
 1
1  "0
n
 1 k
pE

=
 
0
 1
m  k
pE

=

m  k
pE  
 1
 1
D Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1 : The existence of an imperfect competitive equilibrium
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It simply remains to show that there exists a positive permit price picE which clears this market, i.e.
Eic(picE ) = d

picE + c

  
 
0
 1
m  k
picE

= d

picE + c

 

m

 k
picE
 
 1
= E
So let us rst observe that limpE!0 E
ic(pE) = d(c) > 0 since  2 ]0; 1[ and that limpE!+1 Eic(pE) < 0 since
limpE!+1 d
 
picE + c

= 0. Moreover:
dEic
dpE
= d0

picE + c

  m  k
(1  )  p2E

m

 k
pE
 1
 1
< 0
we can therefore say that 8m 2 ]1;+1[, 8E 2 [0; d(c)], there exists a unique picE (m;E) which clears this market.
Step 2 : The e¤ect of a change in the pollution cap E
We know that, picE (m;E), A
ic(m;E) and Qicm(m;E) solve:8><>:
Qicm(m;E) 
 
Aic(m;E)

= E
 Qicm(m;E) + d
 
picE (m;E) + c

= 0
  picE (m;E) 
 
Aic(m;E)
 1
= m  k
(8)
So if we di¤erentiate this system with respect to E, we obtain after simplication:2664
1     Aic 1 0
 1 0 d0  picE + c
0  (1  )  picE Aic
3775 
2664
@Qic
@m
@Aic
@m
@picE
@m
3775 =
2664
1
0
0
3775
We can therefore say that:2664
@Qic
@E
@Aic
@E
@picE
@E
3775 = 1 
2664
(1  )  picE  d0
 
picE + c

   Aic     Aic 1  d0  picE + c
Aic Aic  d0  picE + c
(1  )  picE (1  )  picE   
 
Aic
 1
3775 
2664
1
0
0
3775
=
1


2664
(1  )  picE  d0
 
picE + c

Aic
(1  )  picE
3775 with the property that
2664
(> 0)
(< 0)
(< 0)
3775
with  = (1  )  picE  d0(picE + c)   
 
Aic

< 0.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1 : The e¤ect of a change in the margin m
By a similar argument as in Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 4, we can say that:2664
1     Aic 1 0
 1 0 d0  picE + c
0  (1  )  picE Aic
3775 
2664
@Qic
@m
@Aic
@m
@picE
@m
3775 =
2664
0
0
k

  Aic2 
3775
It follows that:
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2664
@Qic
@m
@Aic
@m
@picE
@m
3775 = 1 
2664
(1  )  picE  d0
 
picE + c

   Aic     Aic 1  d0  picE + c
Aic Aic  d0  picE + c
(1  )  picE (1  )  picE   
 
Aic
 1
3775 
2664
0
0
k

  Aic2 
3775
=
k

  Aic2 

2664
    Aic 1  d0  picE + c
 d0  picE + c
    Aic 1
3775 with the property that
2664
(< 0)
(< 0)
(> 0)
3775
with  = (1  )  picE  d0(picE + c)   
 
Aic

< 0.
Step 2 : Perfect versus imperfect competition
If we now have in mind that for m = 1 the solution to (8) is the competitive equilibrium, it follows that
Aic(m; E) < Ac( E), Qic(m; E) < Qc( E) and picE (m; E) > p
c
E( E) and that these distortions increase with market
power.
F Proof of Proposition 6
This proof is obvious since all observations follow from the results obtained in Proposition 5.
G Proof of Lemma 1
Let us study Esb(m) 2 argmaxE2[0;d(c)]W (m;E). Since W (m;E) is continuous and E 2 [0; d(c)] belongs to a
compact set, it is obvious that a solution exists. Let us now verify that this solution (i) is an interior one and (ii)
is unique.
Step 1 : Esb(m) 2 ]0; d(c)[
In order to verify that the solution is an interior one let us observe that:
(i) limE!0
@W (m;E)
@E
> 0
Since we have assumed that limE!0D0(E) = 0, we obtain by computation that:
lim
E!0
@W (m;E)
@E
= picE (m; 0)  lim
E!0
@Qic(m;E)
@E
  k  lim
E!0
@Aic(m;E)
@E
where picE (m; 0) solves E(p
ic
E (m; 0)) = d
 
picE (m; 0) + c
  m

 k
pic
E
(m;0)
 
 1
= 0
By applying a similar argument as the one of the Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 4 we can even say that
picE (m; 0) > 0. Moreover by Proposition 4, we know that limE!0
@Qic(m;E)
@E
= limE!0
(1 )picE d0(picE+c)
(1 )pic
E
d0(pic
E
+c) (Aic) .
Since picE (m; 0) > 0, the numerator of this expression is di¤erent from 0, so that limE!0
@Qic(m;E)
@E
> 0. Finally,
since (see Proposition 4) 8E > 0, @Aic(m;E)
@E
< 0, we have that limE!0
@Aic(m;E)
@E
 0. We can therefore conclude
that limE!0
@W (m;E)
@E
> 0.
(ii) limE!d(c)
@W (m;E)
@E
< 0
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In this case, by a similar argument as in the proof of Step 1 of Proposition 4, the price which clears the permit
market is now picE (m; d(c)) = 0. Since
@Qic(m;E)
@E
2 [0; 1], we obtain that:
lim
E!d(c)
@W (m;E)
@E
=  k  lim
E!d(c)

@Aic(m;E)
@E

 D0 (d(c))
Now let us remember that @A
ic(m;E)
@E
= A
ic(m;E)
(1 )pic
E
d0(pic
E
+c) (Aic(m;E)) , but when the permit price goes to
zero, there is no incentive to buy abatement good, i.e. limE!d(c)A
ic(m;E) = 0. We can therefore say that
limE!d(c)

@Aic(m;E)
@E

= 0 and conclude that limE!d(c)
@W (m;E)
@E
=  D0 (d(c)) < 0
Step 2 : W (m;E) is strictly concave
Let us observe that:
@2W
@E@E
=
@pE
@E
 @Q
@E
+ pE  @
2Q
@E@E
  k  @
2A
@E@E
 D"(E)
Moreover, if  := (1  )  pE  d0(pE + c)  A < 0, we obtain by computation that:
@pE
@E
 @Q
@E
=
(1  )2  p2E  d0(pE + c)
2
=
1
3
h
(1  )3  p3E 
 
d0(pE + c)
2   (1  )2  p2E  d0(pE + c)   Ai
=
(1  )3  p3E  (d0(pE + c))2
3| {z }
X<0
+
k A  (1  )  pE  d0 (pE + c)
3| {z }
Y >0
 (m  (  1))
since pE  A 1 = m k at equilibrium. With the same argument and the denition of the rst order derivatives
(see Step 2 of Proposition 4), we can also say that:
@2Q
@E@E
=
1
2

  A  (1  )  @pE
@E
 d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE

+ 2 A 1  @A
@E
 (1  )  pE  d0 (pE + c)

=
1
3
  m  k A  (1  )2  d0 (pE + c)   1 + "d0=pE+m  k    (1  ) A  d0 (pE + c)
=
k A  (1  )  d0 (pE + c)
3
m    (1  )   1 + "d0=pE
and that:
@2A
@E@E
=
1
2

@A
@E
 A

(1  )  @pE
@E
 d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE
  2 A 1  @A
@E

=
1
3

A  (1  )  pE  d0(pE + c) A  (1  )2  pE  d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE

+
 A+1 (  1)
3
=
A  (1  )  pE  d0(pE + c)
3
  1  (1  )   1 + "d0=pE+  A+1 (  1)3| {z }
Z>0
It follows that:
@2W
@E@E
= X   k  Z + Y  m  (  1) +m     (1  )   1 + "d0=pE   1  (1  )   1 + "d0=pE
= X   k  Z + Y  2 m   m  1  (m  1)  (1  )   1 + "d0=pE
= X   k  Z   Y 

(2  n  1) + (1  )   1 + "d0=pE  (1  )
n+   1 < 0
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since we have assumed that "d0=pE >  1, n  1 and  2 ]0; 1[ and we know that m = nn+ 1 .
H Proof of Proposition 7
Since for m = 1; the second best pollution cap coincides with the rst best one, i.e. Esb(1) = Ee point (i)
and (ii) of this proposition are obvious when dE
sb
dm
> 0. So let us now check this last point by applying the
implicit theorem function to the rst order condition given by Equation 6. In this case we can say that dE
sb
dm
=
  @2W (m;E)
@E@m
 @
2W (m;E)
@E@E
. But we also known that @
2W (m;E)
@E@E
< 0 (see Lemma 1), it therefore remains to verify that
@2W (m;E)
@E@m
> 0. So let us observe that
@2W
@E@m
=
@pE
@m
 @Q
@E
+ pE  @
2Q
@E@m
  k  @
2A
@E@m
We can also say that:
@pE
@m
 @Q
@E
=
 k
2
  A 1  (1  )  pE  d0 (pE + c)
=
k2  (1  )  d0 (pE + c)
3| {z }
W>0
m   (1  )  pE  d0(pE + c) + A
@2Q
@E@m
=
1
2

  A  (1  )  @pE
@m
 d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE

+ 2 A 1  @A
@m
 (1  )  pE  d0 (pE + c)

+
1
2

3 A2 1 

  @A
@m

| {z }
V >0
=
  (1  ) A 1  d0 (pE + c)
2


 A  @pE
@m
  1 + "d0=pE+   @A@m  pE

+ V
=
k2  (1  )  d0 (pE + c)
pE 3 m 

 A   1 + "d0=pE    pE  d0 (pE + c)+ V
@2A
@E@m
=
1
2

@A
@m
 A

(1  )  @pE
@m
 d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE
  2 A 1  @A
@m

=
1
2

@A
@m
 (1  )  pE  d0(pE + c) A  (1  )  @pE
@m
 d0 (pE + c) 
 
1 + "d0=pE
  (1  ) A  @A
@m

=
k  (1  )  d0 (pE + c)
3
  pE  d0(pE + c) +  A   2 + "d0=pE
By substitution we obtain:
@2W
@E@m
= V +X  (m  1)  A   2 + "d0=pE  pE  d0(pE + c) > 0
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